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PASSPORT REVOCATIONS OR DENIALS
ON THE GROUND OF NATIONAL
SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY
INTRODUCTION
Section 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) requires
that aliens and citizens who wish to enter or leave the country have
passports.' A passport2 is also a practical necessity for world travel
b~cause it is almost impossible to enter a foreign country without
one. 3  Directly competing with this need of individual travelers,
1. 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978). The section provides that "it
shall . . . be unlawful-(1) for any alien to depart from or enter or attempt to depart
from or enter the United States except under such reasonable rules, regulations, and
orders . . . as the President may prescribe." Id. § 1185(a). It also states that "it
shall . . be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or
attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid passport."
Id. § 1185(b).
2. A passport, by its nature, is addressed to foreign powers. See Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. 116, 121-22 (1958); Urtetiqui v. D'Arcy, 34 U.S. 452, 456, 9 Pet. 692, 699
(1835); United States v. Browder, 113 F.2d 97, 98 (2d Cir. 1940), aff'd, 312 U.S. 335
(1941). It requests permission for the bearer to come and go freely, as well as for all
lawful aid and protection. United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475, 481 (1967); Urtetiqui
v. D'Arcy, 34 U.S. at 456, 9 Pet. at 699; Worthy v. United States, 328 F.2d 386, 391
(5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Browder, 113 F.2d at 98; Department of State, The
American Passport 4 (1898) [hereinafter cited as The American Passport]; 3 J. Moore,
A Digest of International Law 856 (1906). It identifies a citizen and is evidence of his
citizenship for the purpose of foreign.travel. United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. at 481;
Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1950); United States v. Brow-
der, 113 F.2d at 98; 3 G. Hackworth, Digest of International Law § 259, at 435
(1942); 3 J. Moore, supra, at 856; The American Passport, supra, at 4. A passport, as
it relates to aliens, is defined as "any travel document issued by competent authority
showing the bearer's origin, identity, and nationality if any, which is valid for the
entry of the bearer into a foreign country." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(30) (1976). But see
Miller v. Sinjen, 289 F. 388, 394 (8th Cir. 1923) (passport not even evidence of
citizenship). Furthermore, on re-entry into the United States, it is the usual and
convenient manner of proving citizenship. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. at 121; United
States v. Browder, 113 F.2d at 99. The passport is also evidence of permission to
travel, Worthy v. United States, 328 F.2d at 391, and recognizes the bearer's right
to receive American diplomatic protection abroad. United States v. Laub, 385 U.S.
at 481; 3 G. Hackworth, supra, § 259, at 435; 2 C. Hyde, International Law Chiefly
As Interpreted and Applied by the United States 1196-97 (2d rev. ed. 1945). Accord-
ing to Professor Borchard, a passport is merely a certificate of citizenship. 2 E.
Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad 493 (1915). Technically, a
passport is the visa affixed to the certificate by the foreign country. Id. This is the
political nature of a passport. Urtetiqui v. D'Arcy, 34 U.S. at 456, 9 Pet. at 699; 8
M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law 197 (1967). Originally, this was the sole
function of the passport. It was merely a desirable incident to travel. See Shachtman
v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d at
981.
3. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 507 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116, 121 (1958); Browder v. United States, 312 U.S. 335, 339 (1941); Shacht-
1178
1981] PASSPORT REVOCATIONS 1179
however, is the concern of the federal government in managing for-
eign affairs. As the Supreme Court has observed, travel abroad can
have a direct impact on foreign policy by involving the United States
in "dangerous international incidents."'
During the first eighty years of this nation's history, public officials
at all levels of government issued passports.' With the enactment of
the Act of August 18, 1856,' however, Congress gave exclusive au-
thority to the Secretary of State to issue a United States passport.'
Although the current version of this Act has been construed to grant
the Secretary discretion to withhold a passport in certain circum-
stances," the extent of his authority is disputed."
Litigants have challenged the Secretary's authority to revoke or
deny passports on such grounds as illegality,'" citizenship," and
Communism," with varying degrees of success." The Executive
man v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1955); 3 G. Hackworth, supra note 2.
§ 259, at 437; Note, "Passport Denied" State Department Practice and Due Process.
3 Stan. L. Rev. 312, 312-14 (1951); Comment, Passport Refusals for Political
Reasons: Constitutional Issues and Judicial Review, 61 Yale L.J. 171, 171 & n.3
(1952) [hereinafter cited as Passport Refusals for Political Reasons].
4. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15 (1965); see B. Schwartz, Constitutional Law
§ 3.15, at 100 (2d ed. 1979).
5. See The American Passport, supra note 2, at 37-40. Passports have been in
use since before the Constitution. Id. at 36-37. In the early days of the Republic,
when there was no specific statute on the subject, federal authority for passport
issuance was exercised by the State Department as part of its traditional duties in the
conduct of foreign affairs. Id. Passports continued to be issued, however, by local
authorities. Id.
6. Act of August 18, 1856, ch. 127, 11 Stat. 52.
7. Id. § 23, 11 Stat. 60. Although some of those who had issued passports prior
to the Act continued to do so after its enactment, these documents had become
illegal. The American Passport, supra note 2, at 41-42.
8. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1965); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 124-25
(1958).
9. See Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 69
(1980) (No. 80-83).
10. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 13 (1965); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 127-28
(1958).
11. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 13 (1965); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 127-28
(1958).
12. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Communist Party of the
United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961); Shachtman v.
Dulles, 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
13. The Secretary's authority to deny passports on grounds of illegality,
citizenship, and fraudulent use of a passport, or to impose area restrictions has been
expressly upheld. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 7 (1965); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116, 127 (1958). His authority to deny passports on grounds of communism and fail-
ure to take an oath of allegiance, however, has been expressly repudiated. Aptheker
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 514 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129-30
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Branch and, in particular, the State Department, have asserted,
however, that the Passport Act of 1926," the successor to the Act of
August 18, 1856,'3 grants the Secretary power to deny a passport. "'
The Secretary's claim of authority is currently being challenged.'- in
Agee v. Muskie," the Secretary revoked the passport of a former
member of the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) who was reveal-
ing the names of undercover C.I.A. agents around the world."' The
(1958); Woodward v. Rogers, 344 F. Supp. 974, 986 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 486 F.2d
1317 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
14. 22 U.S.C. § 211a-218 (1976). Section 211a provides that "[tJhe Secretary of
State may grant and issue passports, and cause passports to be granted, issued, and
verified in foreign countries by diplomatic representatives of the United States, and
by such consul generals, consuls, or vice consuls when in charge, as the Secretary of
State may designate, and by the chief or other executive officer of the insular posses-
sions of the United States, under such rules as the President shall designate and
prescribe for and on behalf of the United States, and no other persons shall grant,
issue, or verify such passports." Id. § 211a. Section 211a was amended in 1978 by
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, which added the sen-
tence: "Unless authorized by law, a passport may not be designated as restricted for
travel to or for use in any country other than a country with which the United States
is at war, where armed hostilities are in progress, or where there is imminent danger
to the public health or the physical safety of United States travellers." 22 U.S.C. §
211a (Supp. II 1978) (codifying Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year
1979, Pub. L. No. 95-426, 92 Stat. 971 (1978)). In Executive Order No. 11,295, 3
C.F.R. 138 (1966 Compilation), pursuant to the authority granted in 3 U.SC. § 301
(1976), the President delegated to the Secretary of State the power "to exercise,
without the approval, ratification, or other action of the President, the authority con-
ferred upon the President by the first section of the Act of July 3, 1926 (22 U.S.C. §
211a), to designate and prescribe for and on behalf of the United States rules gov-
erning the granting, issuing, and verifying of passports."
15. Ch. 127, 11 Stat. 52. Congress has passed several minor amendments to the
statute. See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 79, § 23, 12 Stat. 744, 754; Act of May 30,
1866, ch. 102, 14 Stat. 54; Act of June 14, 1902, ch. 1088, 32 Stat. 386; Act of June
4, 1920, ch. 223, 41 Stat. 739, 750-51.
16. The Secretary has for many years claimed discretion to withhold passports on
various grounds. Some of these grounds include the applicant's illegal conduct, 2 E.
Borchard, supra note 2, at 495; 3 G. Hackworth, supra note 2, § 268, at 498-504; 2
C. Hyde, supra.note 2, at 1195; 3 J. Moore, supra note 2, at 920-23, the applicant's
loyalty and citizenship, 3 G. Hackworth, supra note 2, § 268, at 498, 501; 3 J.
Moore, supra note 2, at 919-20, fraudulent use of a passport, 3 G. Hackworth, supra
note 2, § 268, at 502, travel to certain areas, 4 Fed. Reg. 3892 (1939) (Europe); 3 G.
Hackworth, supra note 2, § 272, at 531-33 (Ethiopia, China, Spain); 33 Dep't State
Bull. 777 (1955) (Albania, Bulgaria, China, Korea and Vietnam), communism or fur-
therance of Communist goals, Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961), mental illness, 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(3) (1980),
and conduct that would seriously damage our national security or foreign policy. 22
C.F.R. § 51.70-.72 (1980).
17. Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 69 (1980)
(No. 80-83).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 81.
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grounds for revocation were that Agee's travel was seriously damaging
the national security' and foreign policy 2' of the United States." The
20. Generally, authorities appear to agree that national security is the protection
of the nation's safety and the prevention of government overthrow by espionage or
subversion, whether threatened domestically or from abroad. National security has
been considered in the context of communism, United States v. Robel, 389 U.S.
258, 262, 267-68 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 606-07 (1967);
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508-09, 514 (1964); Scales v. United
States, 367 U.S. 203, 207-09, 251-53 (1961); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 130
(1958); see Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 93-94 (1961); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364-65 (1937),
electronic surveillance, United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 321
(1972); see Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 613 n.42 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Brownell, The Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39
Cornell L.Q. 195, 199-200 (1954); Rogers, The Case for Wire Tapping, 63 Yale L.J.
792, 793-97 (1954); Comment, Privacy and Political Freedom: Application of the
Fourth Amendment to "National Security" Investigations, 17 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1205,
1222-23, 1236-38 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Privacy and Political Freedom], and
secrecy of important government information. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507,
516 (1980) (per curiam); see New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726
(1971) (per curiam) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 52 (1919); Near v. Minnestoa, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931)); United States v.
Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 992-93 (W.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d
819 (7th Cir. 1979); Special Message from President Eisenhower to the United States
Congress on the Mutual Security Program, [1958] Pub. Papers 32, at 161. In the
passport context, specifically, a New York City Bar Association committee, studying
problems in the area, defined national security as the protection of the nation from
attack and the preservation of the government from threats of overthrow by force and
violence. Special Comm. to Study Passport Procedures of the Ass'n of the Bar of the
City of New York, Freedom to Travel 59 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Freedom to
Travel]; see, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500, 508-09 & n.8 (1964); Agec v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80, 88 (D.C.
Cir.) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 69 (1980) (No. 80-83). See
generally Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 Mich. L.
Rev. 971, 1047-50 (1975); Note, Government Secrecy Agreements and the First
Amendment, 28 Am. U.L. Rev. 395, 410 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Government
Secrecy Agreements]; Comment, Judicial Review of Classified Documents: Amend-
ments to the Freedom of Information Act, 12 Harv. J. Legis. 415, 415-16 (1975);
Note, United States v. Marchetti and Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby: Secrecy 2;
First Amendment 0, 3 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1073, 1093-1101 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as The CIA and the First Amendment]; Note, Reform in the Classification and De-
classification of National Security Information: Nixon Executive Order 11,652, 59
Iowa L. Rev. 110, 110-11 (1973); Privacy and Political Freedom, supra, at 1236-38;
Comment, National Security and the Public's Right to Know: A New Role for the
Courts Under the Freedom of Information Act, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1438, 1438 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as National Security and the FOIA]; Note, Executive Privilege and
the Freedom of Information Act: The Constitutional Foundation of the Amended
National Security Exemption, 1976 Wash. U.L.Q. 609, 609 n.9, 640; Note, National
Security and the Amended Freedom of Information Act, 85 Yale L.J. 401, 408, 411
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Amended Freedom of Information Act].
21. "Foreign policy" entails an assessment of United States priorities in foreign
affairs. Department of State, United States Foreign Policy 3-5 (1975); W. Lippmann,
U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic 9 (1943); Amended Freedom of Informa-
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District of Columbia Circuit held that the Secretary lacked the power
to revoke Agee's passport for national security reasons.,,
This Note examines whether Congress has delegated authority to
the Secretary to revoke or deny passports on the ground of national
security and foreign policy. Because it concludes that the Secretary
has this authority, this Note also considers whether such a revocation
is consistent with the due process guarantee of the fifth amendment.
I. CONSTRUING THE STATUTE-IMPLIED
AUTHORIZATION
Although the President has broad, inherent power to manage the
nation's foreign aflhirs, 24 he has no inherent authority to burden the
tion Act, supra note 20, at 411. It includes those political and diplomatic activities
that are related to the peaceful resolution of international differences that would
otherwise pose a threat to the United States. H.R. Rep. No. 221, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 63-64 (1973). Although other goals of foreign policy have been given, see For-
eign Affairs Division, Congressional Research Service, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Foreign.
Policy Choices for the Seventies and Eighties: Summary of Testimony and Issues In
Hearings Held by the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations 3 (Comm. Print 1976)
("world-wide peace, equality, and economic well-being"), its principal aim is to safe-
guard the national security. J. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War
II, at 1-4 (1980); J. Spanier & E. Uslaner, How American Foreign Policy is Made 13
(1974); see W. Lippmann, supra, at 9. In other words, it is a course of conduct that
effects the goal of national security.
22. Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d at 82.
23. Id. at 87.
24. The President's power to conduct foreign affairs has been described as "plo-
nary." United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936); L.
Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 37 (1972); L. Tribe, American Constitu-
tional Law § 4-3, at 164 (1978). Some of this authority is enumerated in the Constitu-
tion. For example, the Constitution provides that "[tihe President shall be Com-
mander in Chief of the Army and Navy," U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1, "[h]e shall
have Power . . . to make Treaties . . . and . . . shall appoint Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls," id., cl. 2, and "shall receive Ambassadors and other
public Ministers." Id. § 3. Moreover, the power to "receive Ambassadors" gives the
President the ability to decide whether a foreign government will be recognized by
the United States. B. Schwartz, supra note 4, § 5.13, at 186; see Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 211-12 (1962); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137-38
(1938); Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890). He also shares with Con-
gress the power to conduct foreign affairs. L. Henkin, supra, at 27; B. Schwartz,
supra note 4, § 5.13, at 185. Although the President has few enumerated foreign
affairs powers, and shares with Congress those unenumerated powers inherent in the
federal government, the President has the greater role in the area of foreign affairs.
B. Schwartz, supra note 4, § 5.13, at 185; see L. Tribe, supra, § 4-3, at 163-64. John
Marshall observed in 1820 that "[t]he president is the sole organ of the nation, in its
external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations." Address by Hon.
John Marshall, House of Representatives of the United States, reprinted in 18 U.S.
212, 5 Wheat. app. 26 (1820).
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constitutional rights of individual citizens.' Only Congress has the
power to burden a constitutional right, such as the right to travel
embodied in a passport.26 In section 211a of the Passport Act,
however, Congress delegated its authority to restrict travel to the
Executive Branch. The section provides that "[t]he Secretary of State
may grant and issue passports .. .under such rules and regulations
as the President shall designate." 27 Pursuant to this power,z2 the
Secretary has promulgated regulations under which he may revoke or
deny a passport if he "determines that the national's activities abroad
are causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national
security or the foreign policy of the United States." '  Because sec-
25. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 127-29 (1958); see Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1,
5-6 (1957); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)
(the President must act in subordination to the Constitution); L. Henkin, supra note
24, at 87-88, 106 (both Congress' and the President's powers are limited by the
Constitution; when Congress has acted, Congress should prevail); L. Tribe, supra
note 24, at 164 (the President's foreign affairs power is limited by Congress).
Moreover, both Congress' and the President's authority in foreign affairs is limited
by what the Constitution enumerates as being exclusively within the other's author-
ity. See L. Henkin, supra note 24, at 92-93. For example, the President cannot
declare war and Congress cannot make treaties. id. at 92-95.
26. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958). In Kent, the Court stated in dicta
that if Congress has delegated the power to revoke passports under this Act to the
Secretary "the standards must be adequate to pass scrutiny by the accepted tests."
Id. The Court in Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), decided whether Congress had
given the Secretary sufficient standards. Id. at 17-18. Congress has extensive author-
ity in the area of foreign affairs. As Professor Henkin has stated, "[t]oday, there is
surely no warrant for confident assertion that there is any matter relating to foreign
affairs that is not subject to legislation by Congress." L. Henkin, supra note 24, at
76. Congress has both enumerated and inherent constitutional powers over foreign
affairs. Id. at 67-68; B. Schwartz, supra note 4, § 5.13, at 185. Congress also has the
authority to protect our national security. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S.
500, 509 (1964); see United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1967); Communist
Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 95-96
(1961). Nevertheless, Congress may not ignore the Bill of Rights merely because
those affected by the legislation are abroad. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957).
27. 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1976).
28. See id.; note 14 supra.
29. 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4) (1980). This regulation also allows the Secretary to
refuse to issue a passport, among other reasons, if the applicant has not repaid
money lent by the United States for return to this country, id. § 51.70(b)(1), is
incompetent, id. § 51.70(b)(2), or is an unmarried minor whose guardian does not
authorize the passport's issuance or does not guarantee any United States loans to
the minor for his return to the country. Id. § 51.70(b)(3). The regulations also permit
the Secretary to revoke passports on these grounds. Id. § 51.71. The Secretary has
also promulgated a regulation under which passports must be denied. Id. § 51.70(a).
The regulation mandates the denial of a passport, except for direct return to the
United States, if the applicant is the subject of a federal warrant for a felony, id. §
51.70(a)(1), is required by a court order to remain in the country, id. § 51.70(a)(2),
has been committed to a mental institution, id. § 51.70(a)(3), is the subject of a
request for extradition from a foreign country, id. § 51.70(a)(4), is under subpoena for
a federal prosecution or investigation of a felony, id. § 51.70(a)(5), or has not repaid a
1981] 1183
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tion 211a contains neither language expressly authorizing passport
revocations or denials on the ground of national security and foreign
policy, nor language expressly proscribing such refusals,' it is unclear
whether Congress intended the Secretary to have this authority. To
justify the use of this power, therefore, it must be determined
whether Congress has implicitly consented.,'
A. Administrative Practice
In Kent v. Dulles,3 2 the Supreme Court established a test to deter-
mine whether Congress has implicitly approved of certain grounds for
passport refusals. Grounds for denial are proper only if it can "fairly
be argued" that Congress has adopted the particular category of re-
fusals "in light of prior administrative practice."' 3 Subsequently, the
Court clarified the Kent test in Zemel v. Rusk.," It explained that
congressional adoption of an administrative practice could be deter-
mined by examining two factors.3 5 First, Congress must have
enacted new legislation on the subject of passports in which it had
the opportunity to rebut the Secretary's claimed authority.- Second,
it clearly must not have taken that opportunity.37 Moreover, implicit
in these guidelines is the requirement that Congress must have been
aware of this administrative practice.n
The Secretary has clearly established an administrative practice of
revoking or denying passports for national security reasons. He has
consistently revoked or denied passports whenever necessary to pro-
loan from the United States. Id. § 51.70(a)(6). The regulations also permit the
Secretary to revoke passports on these grounds. Id. § 51.71.
30. 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1976 & Supp. 11 1978); see note 14 supra. The only limita-
tion on the Secretary's authority that is expressly stated in the statute is a limitation
on the ability to impose area restrictions. 22 U.S.C. § 211a-218 (1976 & Supp. II
1978); see Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1965).
31. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 301 (1944).
32. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
33. Id. at 128; accord, Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S: 1, 17-18 (1965). In deciding
what constitutes an administrative practice, both passport denials and revocations are
equally relevant because they restrict the right to travel abroad. Aptheker v. Secre-
tary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958).
In Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), the Court considered the Secretary's adminis-
trative practice of restricting passports for travel to certain areas. Id. at 8-11. It
considered both restrictions imposed on newly issued passports as well as on those
outstanding at the time of the imposition of the restrictions. Id. This includes restric-
tions on the right to travel both before and after the right has been exercised and,
thus, includes situations similar to both denials and revocations.
34. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
35. Id. at 11-12.
36. Id. at 12.
37. Id.
38. See id.; Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80, 86 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 101 S.
Ct. 69 (1980) (No. 80-83).
1184 [Vol. 49
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tect the safety of the nation," to prevent the overthrow of the govern-
ment by subversion or espionage,' ° or to ensure that American rela-
tions with foreign countries will not be impaired." Although the
Agee court determined that the Secretary had not established a con-
sistent administrative practice, it did not consider all the evidence of
that practice. The court stated that only eleven cases contesting the
Secretary's practice had arisen both before and after the enactment of
the Passport Act.' The Secretary, however, has revoked or denied
39. Department of State Passport Policies: Hearings on Department of State Pass-
port Policies Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
10 (1957) [hereinafter cited as 1957 Senate Hearings] (statement of Robert Murphy)
(the Secretary claimed authority in 1957 to revoke the passport of a citizen engaging
in activities detrimental to the national interest); see 3 J. Moore, supra note 2, at 920
(the Secretary refused to issue passports in 1861 to persons whose conduct would be
"hostile and injurious to the peace of the country and dangerous to the Union'); 26
Dep't State Bull. 919 (1952) (passport denied to person whose activities would be
detrimental to the United States); Passport Refusals for Political Reasons, supra note
3, at 174-78, 178 n.58 (during period from 1947 to 1951, more than ten passport
applications were refused on grounds that the applicant's travel was not in the "best
interests of the United States").
40. See Passport Legislation: Hearings on S. 2770, S. 3998, S. 4110, and S. 4137
Before Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23, 25, 30
(1958) [hereinafter cited as 1958 Senate Hearings] (statement of Robert Murphy) (the
Department claimed authority to deny passports when it would otherwise be "inimi-
cal to the security of the United States"); Denial of Passports to Persons Knowingly
Engaged in Activities Intended to Further the International Communist Movement:
Hearings on H.R. 13760 Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. 7 (1958) [hereinafter cited as 1958 House Hearings] (statement of Loftus
Becker) (Department felt that decision in Kent did not affect the Secretary's authority
to revoke passports on national security grounds because Kent dealt only with revoca-
tions on grounds of Communism); Staff of Senate Comm. on Government Opera-
tions, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., Report on S. 2095, Reorganization of the Passport Func-
tions of the Dep't of State 13 (Comm. Print 1960) (Secretary has authority to with-
hold a passport as part of his responsibility to protect the best interests of the United
States); 2 C. Hyde, supra note 2, at 1195-96 (passports refused to those who might
use them to engage in espionage or subversive activities).
41. See 1957 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 38-40 (State Department statis-
tics of passport refusals for 1955 and 1956, including passports refused on grounds of
participation in foreign political affairs deemed harmful to good relations and those
refused to persons whose conduct abroad has brought discredit on the United States
and caused difficulties for other Americans); 26 Dep't State Bull. 919 (1952) (passport
denied when it would impair the conduct of foreign relations); Department of State,
Notice to All Bearers of Passports 2 (Jan. 1, 1948-Jan. 15, 1955) (interfering in
political activities of foreign countries grounds for refusal of a passport); 2 Depart-
ment of State, Papers Relating to Foreign Relations of the United States 1033 (1907)
(passport refused because applicant was "disturbing, or endeavoring to disturb"
United States relations with foreign countries); 3 G. Hackworth, supra note 2, § 268, at
501 (passport denied to someone who would bring "grave discredit on the United
States" or take part in the military or political affairs of a foreign government in such
a way that it would be "contrary to the policy or inimical to the welfare of the
United States').




passports on these grounds on many more occasions.' Moreover, he
has notified passport holders of this practice.'
Additionally, Congress has been made aware of the Secretary's
practice. The Executive Branch has frequently informed Congress of
the Secretary's position in hearings on the State Department's pass-
port policies,' 5 in hearings on passport legislation, 6 and during debate
on related bills. 47  Moreover, Congress has recognized these policies
in its own reports a and documents49 concerning passport legislation.
Since the enactment of the Passport Act of 1926, ° Congress has
enacted legislation amending the passport requirement of section 215
of the INA. 5 Although it was aware of the Secretary's policy, in
43. Since 1861 the Secretary has revoked or denied passports for several reasons
related to national security or foreign policy. See 1958 Senate Hearings, supra note
40, at 30 (State Dep't statistics; 57 passports revoked for illegal activities or activities
prejudicial to foreign relations); 1957 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, at 38-40 (State
Dep't statistics; 31 refusals for conduct harmful to good relations or detrimental to
the United States; 411 refusals for "security reasons"); 2 C. Hyde, supra note 2, .at
1195-96 (passport refused for subversive activities or espionage); 3 J. Moore, supra
note 2, at 920 (refusals for national security reasons); 26 Dep't State Bull. 919 (1952)
(passport refused for activities that would be detrimental to interests of United States
or would impair foreign relations); Passport Refusals for Political Reasons, supra note
3, at 174-78, 178 n.58 (more than ten refusals on grounds that travel not in the best
interests of the United States).
44. Department of State, Notice to All Bearers of Passports 2 (Jan. 1, 1948-Jan.
15, 1955).
45. See 1957 Senate Hearings, supra note 39, in which the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations considered the passport policies of the State Department and was
informed of the policy of revoking passports on grounds of national security, id. at 10
(statement of Robert Murphy), and was provided with statistics of passport revoca-
tions on foreign policy grounds. Id. at 38-40 (State Dep't statistics).
46. 1958 Senate Hearings, supra note 40, at 22-23, 30 (statement of Robert
Murphy); 1958 House Hearings, supra note 40, at 7 (statement of Loftus Becker).
47. In 1958, President Eisenhower sent a message to Congress that was read
during debate. It informed Congress that the Secretary would withhold a passport if
the applicant's travel would be inimical to United States foreign relations, and if
there would be danger to the national security. Message from President Eisenhower
to the United States Congress on the Issuance of Passports, 104 Cong. Rec. 13046
(1958). Congress has been continually reminded of this policy. The message was
reprinted in a 1958 House Report, H.R. Rep. No. 2684, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3
(1958), in Senate Hearings in 1966, Proposed Travel Controls: Hearings on S. 3243
Before the Subcomm. to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act
and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 1966 Senate Hearings], and in a 1972
House Report, H.R. Rep. No. 1461, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1972).
48. H.R. Rep. No. 1461, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1972); H.R. Rep. No. 2684,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1958).
49. H.R. Doe. No. 417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1958] U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 5465, 5465.
50. Ch. 772, 44 Stat. 887 (current version at 22 U.S.C. §§ 211a-218 (1976 &
Supp. II 1978)).
51. In 1978, Congress amended both the Passport Act and section 215 of the
INA. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-426,
§§ 124, 707, 92 Stat. 963, 971, 992-93 (1978).
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amending the Passport Act in 1978, Congress did not change section
211a in any way that would preclude the Secretary's practice of re-
voking passports on the ground of national security or foreign
policy. 2 Congress merely amended section 211a to curtail the au-
thority to impose area restrictions on foreign travel.?3 Thus, under
the Zemel test, this action constitutes adoption of the administrative
practice of the Secretary.
Admittedly, in 1958 and 1966, bills were introduced in Congress
that would have expressly given the Secretary authority to deny pass-
ports on the ground of national security.m Although these bills did
not pass, this provides no inference that the Secretary did not already
have this authority.- Nor does it indicate that Congress intended to
preclude this authority.' Moreover, Congress may have failed to act
for reasons unrelated to the Secretary's power to revoke passports on
the ground of national security and foreign policy. For example, the
1958 bills were introduced in response to the Kent decision ' in
which the Court held that Congress had not authorized the Secretary
to deny passports to Communists.m Although these bills were intro-
52. See notes 1 & 14 supra. Acquiescence and failure to repeal has often been
held to be persuasive evidence that Congress has accepted an administrative prac-
tice, which is, therefore, entitled to great weight. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11
(1965); Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 313 (1933);
Costanza v. Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341, 345 (1932). When a constitutional right, such
as the right to travel, is involved, however, authority to limit it cannot be assumed
from mere "acquiescence or non-action." Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507
(1959). This difficulty is obviated because this is not a case of mere inaction. Con-
gress has remained active in this area by enacting new passport legislation since the
Passport Act. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11 (1965).
53. The Secretary's authority to impose area restrictions for travel abroad vas
limited to countries "with which the United States is at war, where armed hostilities
are in progress, or where there is imminent danger to the public health or the
physical safety of United States travellers." Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fis-
cal Year 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-426, 92 Stat. 971 (1978) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 211a
(Supp. II 1978)).
54. See, e.g., S. 2770, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprinted in 1958 Senate
Hearings, supra note 40, at 2-3; S. 4110, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprinted in
1958 Senate Hearings, supra note 40, at 4-7; H.R. 13760, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1958), reprinted in H.R. Rep. No. 2684, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1958); S. 3243,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966 Senate Hearings, supra note 47, at
1-4; H.R. 14895, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966 Senate Hearings,
supra note 47, at 75-84.
55. See United States v. Board of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 119, 135 (1978); NLRB v.
Plasterers' Local Union, 404 U.S. 116, 129-30 (1971); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1970); Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61,
69 (1946); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-20 (1940); cf. Dobson v. Commis-
sioner, 320 U.S. 489, 505-06 (1943) (congressional enactment of a law does not neces-
sarily imply that the law prior to its enactment was different).
56. See H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Maldng
and Application of the Law 1395-97 (tent. ed. 1958).
57. See H.R. Rep. No. 2684, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958).
58. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
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duced to permit such revocations or denials,59 they only incidently
included provisions for revocation or denial on the ground of national
security.6" These bills did not pass primarily because Congress
feared that they could be used to revoke or deny passports of indi-
viduals who were not proven Communists.6'
B. Construing sections 211a and 215 in pari materia
The Secretary's authority to revoke passports for national security
reasons is also supported by the doctrine of in par! materia. Accord-
ing to this rule of construction, statutes relating to the same subject
matter are to be construed together to give effect to the purposes of
each.2 Both section 211a of the Passport Act and section 215 of the
INA deal with passports. Section 215 requires travelers to obtain
passports when entering or leaving the country.63 Section 211a gives
the Secretary authority to issue passports and gives the President au-
thority to promulgate rules and regulations concerning their
issuance.61
59. H.R. Rep. No. 2684, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958).
60. See 1958 Senate Hearings, supra note 40, at 2 (statement of Robert Murphy)
(the bill's purpose was to deny passports to Communists). The national security pro-
vision was included only to permit the Secretary to control the travel of Communists.
See id. at 30 (statement of Roderic O'Connor).
61. H.R. Rep. No. 2684, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958). Senator Fulbright stated
that the bill was an inappropriate remedy for achieving its stated purpose. 1958 Sen-
ate Hearings, supra note 40, 30-31, 33 (statement of Sen. Fulbright). Another criti-
cism of the bills, voiced during the hearing on the House versions, was the State
Department contention that the proposed bill would give the Secretary unrevIewable
discretion to deny or revoke a passport. 1958 House Hearings, supra note 40, at
29-30 (statement of Rep. Hays). Senator Humphrey noted that under one version,
persons "who are not known Communists, who are not known subversives, who are
not known felons" would be denied passports. 1958 Senate Hearings, supra note 40,
at 49 (statement of Sen. Humphrey). He interpreted this bill as allowing an
appointed administrative officer to revoke a passport on grounds that would violate
due process and therefore be unconstitutional. Id. at 49-50 (statement of Sen.
Humphrey).
62. United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64 (1940); 2A C. Sands, Sutherland's
Statutes and Statutory Construction § 51.01, at 287 (3d rev. ed. 1973). The doctrine
is used to aid in interpretation when the precise meaning of a statute is unclear. It is
a variation of the principle that all parts of the same statute should be read together.
Id. at 288. It is assumed that when a legislature enacts a new statute, it has in mind
prior statutes relating to the same subject matter, id. § 51.02, at 290, and that the
provision was enacted in accord with the legislative purpose embodied in the prior
statutes. See Allen v. Grand Central Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535, 551-52 n.19 (1954).
63. 8 U.S.C. § 1185(b) (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
64. 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1976 & Supp. II 1978); see notes 1 & 14 supra. Even
though an act is silent on the subject of a grant of power to an administrative agency,
the power may exist. Such a power may be necessary for the successful operation of




The purpose of section 215 is to protect the national security and
foreign policy of the United States. An examination of the earlier ver-
sions of this section indicates that this has always been Congress' in-
tention. The predecessor of section 215, enacted in 1918,1 was in-
tended to prevent leaks of important military information to enemy
countries and to prevent the travel of American citizens who were
enemy agents.6 The Secretary, however, could only exercise this
power during time of war and if the public safety so required.' The
INA was reenacted in 1941 s to prevent subversive activities " and to
promote the national defense.'0 Moreover, in 1952, when Congress
kept the Act from lapsing7 ' by enacting a new statute, "2 its express
purpose was "to insure the national security."I' In 1978, Congress
extended the requirement of section 215 to peacetime.7' Its stated
reason was that the President should be able to control travel when it
is inconsistent with a "greater government interest" or with American
foreign policy interests.
65. Act of May 22, 1918, ch. 81, § 1, 40 Stat. 559 (current version at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1185 (1976 & Supp. 1I 1978)). This was the first statute requiring passports for the
travel of American citizens abroad. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 123 (1958).
66. H.R. Rep. No. 485, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1918). The bill was intended to
give the Executive the power to control travel into and out of the country, 56 Cong.
Rec. 6029 (1918) (remarks of Rep. Flood), and to give him wide discretion. H.R.
Rep. No. 485, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1918).
67. Act of May 22, 1918, ch. 81, § 1, 40 Stat. 559 (current version at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1185 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978)).
68. An Act to Amend the Act of May 22, 1918, Pub. L. No. 77-114, § 1, 55 Stat.
252-53 (1941).
69. The statute was intended to provide a "clearinghouse ... where people com-
ing and going ... can be checked upon, so as to prevent sabotage and 'fifth column'
activities." 87 Cong. Rec. 5049 (1941) (remarks of Rep. Johnson).
70. Id. at 5048 (letter of Ruth B. Shipley); S. Rep. No. 444, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1941). It was also intended to prevent the travel of those whose activities
were "inimical to the best interests of the United States." Id. at 1-2; 87 Cong. Rec.
5048 (1941) (letter of Ruth B. Shipley); id. at 5049 (remarks of Rep. Eberharter).
71. Congress temporarily extended the effectiveness of the provisions of the 1941
amendment with a series of resolutions. H.R.J. Res. 477, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 66
Stat. 330, 333 (1952); H.R.J. Res. 481, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 66 Stat. 137 (1952); S.J.
Res. 156, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 66 Stat. 96 (1952); H.R.J. Res. 423, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess., 66 Stat. 54, 57 (1952).
72. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, ch. 2, § 215, 66 Stat.
163, 190 (1952) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978)). This
statute was substantially the same as the old one. H.R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess. 53 (1952).
73. H..J. Res. 477, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 66 Stat. 330, 333 (1952); H.R.J. Res.
481, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 66 Stat. 137 (1952); S.J. Res. 156, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 66
Stat. 96 (1952); H.R.J. Res. 423, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 66 Stat. 54, 57 (1952).
74. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-426,
92 Stat. 971 (1978) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (Supp. II 1978)); see H.R. Rep. No.
1535, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1978).
75. S. Rep. No. 842, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1978).
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Because national security can be considered a "greater government
interest, '76 the Secretary's power to revoke passports under section
211a is consistent with the purposes of section 215. Most importantly,
without this authority, the Executive Branch would be unable to
effectuate the underlying congressional purpose of section 215. Con-
sequently, section 211a must be read to authorize passport revoca-
tions on the ground of national security.'
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
It is clear that section 211a of the Passport Act delegates authority
to the Secretary to revoke or deny passports on the ground of na-
tional security and foreign policy. Moreover, even though the right to
travel abroad is constitutionally protected,"8 governmental infringe-
ment on this right in the form of revocations or denials of passports
does not violate the procedural and substantive due process rights of
travelers abroad who threaten the nation's safety or foreign relations.,,
76. Id. In Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam), the Court
found that national security was a compelling governmental interest, id. at 509 n.3,
and that it was sufficient to override the constitutional rights of a citizen. Id. at 509
& n.3.
77. Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80, 108 (D.C. Cir.) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting),
cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 69 (1980) (No. 80-83); Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 31,
Agee v. Muskie, No. 80-83 (filed July 18, 1980). Additionally, the decision in Zemel
v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), suggests that Congress implicitly authorized passport
revocations on the ground of national security and foreign policy. The Court held
that the Secretary was not required to issue passports if he had concluded that the
travel of any citizens to an area might involve the United States in "dangerous inter-
national incidents." Id. at 15. The Court justified its conclusions with the "weightiest
considerations of national security." Id. at 16. Hence, the Court recognized the
Secretary's authority to deny passports to all citizens for travel to any area when such
travel is contrary to our national security. This broad power necessarily includes the
lesser power to deny a passport to one citizen for travel to any area when such travel
is contrary to national security. Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80, 95 (D.C. Cir.) (Mac-
Kinnon, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 69 (1980) (No. 80-83). The sound-
ness of this argument can be demonstrated under principles of formal logic. It re-
duces to a mere case of "universal specification," which, under principles of formal
logic, is a basic rule. Any sentence derived under that nle, from a true set of prem-
ises, is a valid sentence with a true conclusion. B. Mates, Elementary Logic 111-13
(2d ed. 1972).
78. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378
U.S. 500, 505-06 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125, 129 (1958).
79. The requirement that liberty not be deprived without due process does not
mean that it can never be deprived. Worthy v. United States, 328 F.2d 386, 393 (5th
Cir. 1964); Woodward v. Rogers, 344 F. Supp. 974, 986-87 (1972), aff'd, 486 F.2d
1317 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 (1965) (upheld infringe-
ment of right to travel by means of area restrictions); 1.958 House Hearings, supra
note 40, at 7 (statement of Rep. Vorys) ("An American citizen's right to locomotion is
circumscribed by the law at every traffic light. To me to talk about a constitutional
right to travel that can't be stopped in the public interest is puzzling to say the
least.").
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Procedural due process, in its strictest sense, requires notice and
the opportunity to be heard." The notice given must be timely and
adequate, and detail the reasons for the action." The hearing re-
quirement is satisfied when the person who may be adversely
affected has an effective opportunity to defend." He must be
allowed to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses and have
access to adverse information used by the government.' He is also
entitled to present his own arguments ' and to be represented by an
attorney, if he desires. Additionally, he has the right to a decision
based on evidence presented at the hearing."
The Secretary's procedures for passport revocations comport with
the requirements of procedural due process." The regulations
80. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 68 (1932); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914); Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U.S. 78, 110-11 (1908). Procedural due process is flexible and of no fixed con-
tent. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976). If the procedural protections
are sufficient to protect the individual interests involved, formal notice and a hearing
are not required. Id. at 333-35. In deciding what process is due, the Court in
Mathews found that "due process generally requires consideration of three distinct
factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail." Id. at 335 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-71 (1970)).
This Note is not concerned with what process is due because it concludes that pass-
port revocations or denials satisfy the strictest standards of procedural due process.
See notes 87-97 infra and accompanying text.
81. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970); United States v. Lovett, 328
U.S. 303, 317 (1946).
82. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 69 (1932); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925); see Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
83. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-70 (1970); Greene v. McElroy, 360
U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 317 (1946).
84. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970); Cooke v. United States, 267
U.S. 517, 537 (1925).
85. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970); United States v. Lovett, 328
U.S. 303, 317 (1946); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932); Cooke v. United
States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925).
86. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 302-03 (1937); United States v. Abilene & S. Ry., 265
U.S. 274, 288 (1924). Goldberg suggested that to show compliance, the decision-
maker should give reasons for his result and state the evidence on which it is based.
"[A]n impartial decision maker is essential." 397 U.S. at 271; accord, Parham v. J.R.,
442 U.S. 584, 606 (1979). Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), indicates two
other requirements of procedural due process that must be determined on an indi-
vidual basis. The court hearing the action must have jurisdiction, and there must be
a fair trial. Id. at 110-11.
87. Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80, 91 n.3 (D.C. Cir.) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting),
cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 69 (1980) (No. 80-83).
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promulgated by the Secretary for the denial or revocation of a pass-
port contain the methods of notification of any adverse action, and
the procedures for review.' They require that written notice be
given to the passport holder." The notice must state the reasons for
the action and the available procedures for review.10 The regulations
also provide that a hearing must be granted upon request "' and that
no adverse action may be taken pending the outcome of the hearing.,,
Moreover, the passport holder is expressly entitled to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses,' to be informed of all the evidence
used against him and its source; to present his own evidenpe and
arguments,9 5 and to be represented by counsel if he so desires."
Furthermore, the hearing officer may base his decision only on in-
formation made available to the person adversely affected and made
part of the record of the hearing.9
Substantive due process requires, generally, that the government
avoid unreasonable or arbitrary actions.' The Supreme Court has
formulated various standards of review to determine whether a par-
ticular governmental action satisfies substantive due process." The
lowest standard requires that there be a rational relationship between
the action and a legitimate governmental interest." The intermedi-
ate test requires a fair and substantial relationship to an important
governmental interest.'' The strictest standard requires a compelling
88. 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.75-.89 (1980).
89. Id. § 51.75.
90. Id.
91. Id. § 51.81.
92. Id. The person affected also receives notice of the hearing date. Id. § 51.82.
93. Id. § 51.85.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. § 51.84.
97. Id. § 51.83.
98. B. Schwartz, supra note 4, § 6.1, at 203-04; see Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497, 499-500 (1954).
99. These are the same standards used to determine whether a statute violates
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969); P. Freund, A. Sutherland, M. Howe & E. Brown,
Constitutional Law 914 (4th ed. 1977).
100. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (equal protection). The lowest
standard is the one most often used by courts. It has been used, for example, in a
commercial context, to determine the validity of a tax statute, Railway Express
Agency v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959) (equal protection), and in a social context, in
measuring the fairness of a welfare termination procedure, Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970) (equal protection), or a school districting system. San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (equal protection).
101. The intermediate standard was developed by the courts for use in cases of
alleged gender-based discrimination. The reasoning behind this test appears to be
that statutes discriminating on the basis of sex should be reviewed under a stricter
standard than the simple "rational relationship test." See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
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governmental interest, and that the means adopted be necessary to
accomplish the government's purpose. "  The strictest standard has
been used when a statute infringes upon a fundamental right, which
has been defined by the Supreme Court as one either "explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."m
The right to travel is twofold: it includes the right to travel inter-
state and the right to travel abroad.'" Interstate travel has been rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court as a fundamental right of
citizenship."in United States citizens have the right to pass through
190, 199-200, 204 (1976) (equal protection); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974)
(same); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (same); Vorchheimer v. School Dist.,
532 F.2d 880, 886 n.7 (3d Cir. 1976) (same), affd per curiam, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
The Supreme Court, however, could not agree as to whether gender-based classifica-
tions should be scrutinized under the strictest standard. Compare Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (plurality opinion) (equal protection) with id. at
691-92 (Powell, J., concurring) (same).
102. The strictest standard is used when a statute employs a classification that is
constitutionally suspect, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973) (equal pro-
tection); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (same); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (equal protection and due process); McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (equal protection); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499
(1954) (due process); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (equal
protection), or when it infringes on a fundamental right. E.g., Roe v. Vade, 410
U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (due process); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972)
(equal protection); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (equal protection
and due process); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (equal protection and due
process); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (equal protec-
tion); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (same). A classification has
been held to be constitutionally suspect when used in a statute or procedure to
discriminate on the basis of race, alienage, or nationality. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S.
717, 721-22 (1973) (equal protection); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372
(1971) (same); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (equal protection and due
process); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (equal protection); Boiling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (due process); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (equal protection).
103. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34
(1973). Rights found to be fundamental by the Court include the right to vote, Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663, 667 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964), the right to
marry and procreate, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), and the right to travel interstate. Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
104. See Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 176 (1978); Califano v. Torres, 435
U.S. 1, 4 n.6 (1978) (per curiam); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 n.8
(1969); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1965). Compare Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112, 237-38 (1970) (Brennan, White, Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (right to travel
interstate) and United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966) (same) and Ed-
wards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 (1941) (same) with Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500, 505 (1964) (right to travel abroad) and Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116, 125 (1958) (same).
105. Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 176 (1978); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112, 237 (1970) (Brennan, White, Marshall, JJ., dissenting); United States v.
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every part of the country unhindered 106 by statutes, rules, or regula-
tions that unreasonably burden or restrict travel.'V The right of in-
ternational travel, on the other hand, has been found to be inherent
in the "liberty" guaranteed by the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.' Although the Court has tested actions infringing the
right to travel interstate against the strictest standard, it has not yet
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966). The courts have not been in agreement as to the
source of this right. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 & n.8 (1969). It has
been found to arise from various constitutional provisions. These provisions include
the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV, Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12
Wall.) 418, 430 (1870); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868); Corfield v.
Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230), the privileges and
immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, Edwards v. California, 314 U.S.
160, 181, 183-85 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78, 97 (1908), and the-commerce clause. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173
(1941); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1867); Passenger Cases, 48 U.S.
300, .518, 7 How. 283, 492 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
106. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 237 (1970) (Brennan, White, Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting). "We are all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same
community, must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without
interruption, as freely as in our own States." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
630 (1969) (quoting Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 300, 518, 7 How. 283, 492 (1849)
(Taney, C.J., dissenting)); accord, United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966);
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 179 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring); Crandall
v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1867).
107. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969).
108. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958). "Liberty" has been read to include
travel abroad. Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 176 (1978); Califano v, Torres,
435 U.S. 1, 4 n.6 (1978) (per curiam); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 (1965); Apthe-
ker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116,
125 (1958); Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1955); cf. Williams v.
Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900) ("Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to
remove from one place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal
liberty, and the right, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the territory of any
State is a right secured by the Fourteenth Amendment and by other provisions of
the Constitution.") The due process clause of the fifth amendment provides that "No
person shall . . . be deprived of ... liberty . . . without due process of law." U.S.
Const. amend. V, el. 3. The term "liberty," as it is used in this clause, is broad.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972) (" 'Liberty' and 'property' are
broad and majestic terms. They are among the '[gireat [constitutional] concepts ...
purposely left to gather meaning from experience .... [Tjhey relate to the whole
domain of social and economic fact, and the statesmen who founded this Nation knew
too well that only a stagnant society remains unchanged.' " (quoting National Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing))); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) ("[L]iberty . . . denotes not
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract,
to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recog-
nized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."); accord,
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650-51 (1972); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
499-500 (1954); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900).
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expressly considered which test applies to a governmental action that
directly infringes on the right to travel abroad.-°  Regardless of
which test is applied to passport revocations, however, the Secre-
tary's actions will not violate due process.
Under the strictest standard, it can be demonstrated that maintain-
ing the security of the nation and preserving the country's foreign
policy are compelling governmental interests. In Snepp v. United
States,"' these interests were weighed against fundamental rights pro-
tected by the first amendment."' Holding that the C.I.A. could im-
pose prior restraints on the otherwise constitutionally protected
speech of its employees,"' the Court found that national security and
foreign policy are compelling governmental interests. 13
109. The courts have distinguished the right to travel interstate from the right to
travel abroad on the ground that the former is a fundamental right, long recognized
as implicit in the Constitution, and the latter is merely an aspect of the liberty
protected by the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Califano v. Aznavorian,
439 U.S. 170, 176 (1978); Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 4 n.6 (1978) (per curiam).
The right to travel abroad is a right implicit in the Constitution because it is pro-
tected by the fifth amendment. Thus, by definition, see note 103 supra and accom-
panying text, it is a fundamental right entitled to review under the strictest standard,
the same standard used for travel interstate. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129
(1958). The Court has recently considered related questions in Califano v. Torres,
435 U.S. 1 (1978) (per curiam), and Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170 (1978). In
Torres, the Court held that certain provisions of the Social Security Act were consti-
tutional when applied to persons who, upon moving to Puerto Rico, lost benefits to
which they were entitled while living in the United States. 435 U.S. at 4-5. Although
the Court assumed for the purposes of the opinion that the right to travel between
the United States and Puerto Rico was equivalent to the right to travel interstate, id.
at 4 n.6, it did not have occasion to consider which standard of review was appli-
cable. Id. Rather, the decision was based on the ground that although a new resident
of a state is entitled to the same benefits as other citizens, he is not entitled to
receive benefits superior to those of his fellow residents merely because he enjoyed
them in the state from which he came. Id. at 4. In Aznavorian, although the Court
stated that laws infringing on freedom to travel abroad are not to be judged by the
same strict standard as those impinging on the right to travel interstate, 439 U.S. at
176-77, it distinguished between direct and incidental burdens on foreign travel. The
Court expressly distinguished the cases of Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), Apthe-
ker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), and Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116
(1958), and based its decision on the ground that the legislation involved had only an
incidental effect on the protected liberty, and thereby had to be "wholly irrational"
before the Court would invalidate it. 439 U.S. at 177. Although Aznavorian used the
rational relationship test to judge an incidental burden on a right, the same standard
need not be used for a direct burden on that right. See Tinker v. Des Moines Inde-
pendent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507-08 (1969); United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
110. 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 509 & n.3.
113. Id. at 509 n.3. The Court stated that "[t]he Government has a compelling
interest in protecting ... the secrecy of information important to our national secu-
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Moreover, passport revocation or denial is a necessary means of
protecting national security and foreign policy. Before the Secretary
can revoke or deny a passport on this ground, it must be dem-
onstrated that the person's travel would seriously damage these
interests.114 Because the government lacks other means of controlling
travel, withholding a passport is the only way the government can
prevent damaging travel."
CONCLUSION
Protection of the national security is an essential function of the
federal government. When citizens traveling abroad may compromise
that security, the government must be able to act quickly to defend
the national interest. Revocation of passports is an effective means to
accomplish this goal.
Evelyn Capassakis
rity." id. It further stated that the government has a compelling interest in protect-
ing "the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our
foreign intelligence service," id., and that "[iut is impossible .. .wisely to make
critical decisions about foreign policy and national defense without the benefit of
dependable foreign intelligence." Id. at 512 n.7.
114. 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.70(b)(4), 51.71 (1980).
115. 56 Cong. Rec. 6029, 6065, 6192 (1918) (remarks of Rep. Flood); see notes
76-77 supra and accompanying text. The Congress that first enacted the statute re-
quiring passports to enter or exit the country recognized that the government was
otherwise without authority to control travel. 56 Cong. Rec. 6029, 6065, 6192 (1918)
(remarks of Rep. Flood).
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